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1. Introduction 
It’s already been twenty-five years since Ian Hacking stated, 
provocatively, that philosophers should start to think about the adventure 
that began back in the 17th century. He meant modern science, of course 
—what was then termed “experimental philosophy.” Hacking was 
intimating that the whole tradition in philosophy of science (including all 
20th century proposals up until Lakatos, Laudan, and the semantic and 
structuralist conceptions, at least) is profoundly inadequate to analyse the 
scientific phenomenon. And the main reason would be that philosophers 
have not elaborated the tools for an adequate understanding of 
experimentation —nor therefore of its role in theory formation. 
During these 25 years, a small trend of “experimentalist” authors has 
grown, among them names such as Hacking, Franklin, Cartwright, and also 
historians like Heilbron, Galison, Buchwald, Steinle —not to forget a good 
number of sociologists such as Collins, Schaffer, Pickering, etc. In my 
opinion, the emergence of new experimentalism has been one of the most 
exciting recent development in the theory of science, if not the most 
fascinating. The reaction among the community of specialists and teachers 
of philosophy of science still seems disappointing to me, being so scarce as 
it is. But perhaps we can be confident that the situation is changing. 
Science’s old name, “experimental philosophy,” suggests already that 
modern science can be regarded as a hybrid of philosophy (logic, theory, 
argument) and experiment (intervention, technics, observation). Of course 
presenting it this way involves a simplification, but I believe it constitutes a 
useful idealisation, if our purpose is to provide a rudimentary model of 
how the cognitive activities of scientists are structured. (Above all, such a 
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model hides the role of interactions among members of the scientific 
community, and between them and other social actors. However, the model 
can integrate social factors, especially if we understand that knowledge —
data and models and theories— is a social product almost by definition.)1 
Following that suggestion, let me propose a triadic model of scientific 
activity based on considering three ‘phases’ in its cognitive processes, or 
three broad categories of scientific practices (which no doubt would have 
to be subdivided into finer types): theoretical activities, experimental 
activities —subsuming here the particular case of observations— and also 
communicational activities. This in itself cannot sound new, but the key 
idea is to emphasize that the experimental ‘phase’ is not reduced or 
subordinated to the theoretical one, and that it calls for a deeper and novel 
analysis. Furthermore, both types of activities are in interaction, and the 
complexity of those interactions still defies philosophers of science. 
Such a scheme is very different from the views offered by traditional 
authors, which by following the linguistic turn and emphasizing logic were 
led to something like a model where there is one principal ‘phase’ of theory 
formation, merely punctuated by the injection of basic statements 
(corresponding to what are usually called observational data). What is 
characteristic of experimental and observational activities remained 
outside the philosopher’s analysis, be it because it was considered 
transparent (as with empiricism) or regarded as exasperatingly swampy (as 
Popper liked to say). In joint work with Javier Ordóñez, we have criticized 
such models for their theoreticism, and we have also traced the origins of 
this tendency back to philosophically inclined theoretical physicists such as 
Boltzmann.2 
                                     
1 Which does not mean (beware the non sequitur) that the analysis of knowledge can be 
merely sociological. 
2 Cf. FERREIRÓS, J. and ORDÓÑEZ, J., “Hacia una Filosofía de la experimentación,” Crítica, v. 34, 
n. 102, (2002), pp. 47–86. 
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No doubt, betting for a philosophy of science that is able to analyse 
the experimental phase complicates matters for the aspiring philosopher, 
because it will force her to augment her panoply of tools. A fine analysis of 
the factors that enter into experimental activity should include questions 
belonging to the cognitive sciences; it cannot be reduced to a logical 
scheme, nor can it be treated in the style of the linguistic turn, and it is 
also insufficient to speak of “paradigms” or “values.” Considered from this 
angle, the misery of theoreticism stems from the way it reduced the 
richness and complexity of scientific procedures to an affair merely of 
conceptual and theoretical elaboration.  
A philosophy of science that closes its eyes to the epistemic specificity 
of experimental life will thereby renounce the goal of understanding what 
is most characteristic of scientific knowledge. Properly considered, this 
already offers an explanation for the peculiar situation we saw towards the 
end of the 20th century, when the rationalism and faith in progress of 
philosophers was confronted head-on by strong sociological approaches. 
The views originating in theoreticist and “logicistic” approaches to the 
philosophy of science were, malgré lui, feeding the sociologism of the 
1980s and 90s. That is because of the way they promoted losing sight of 
the processes by which data are obtained (produced?) in science. They 
promoted excessive simplification of our models of scientific practice, and 
also rigidly formalistic conceptions of human rationality.3 
In my opinion, the “third way” that can take us out of that bog consists 
in a reflection upon scientific practices, understood not as an attractive yet 
void formula, but rather as the decision to fully consider the epistemic and 
                                     
3 The importance of formalistic rationalism as a stimulus for sociological conceptions is 
clear in the work of a central author like Harry M. Collins. See in particular his classic 
COLLINS, H. M., Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992; original edition 1985). It is also abundantly 
known how simplified versions of the theses promoted by Popper, Lakatos, or Quine have 
been appropriated by specialists in STS or sociology of science. 
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cognitive specificity of scientific activities, and in particular experimental 
activities. The plural form is of the essence: there is not scientific practice 
in the singular, but a plurality of coexisting practices, and the crux of the 
analysis has to do with their heterogeneous cognitive roots and their 
complex interactions. It is for this reason that, as a first step and to counter 
their traditional oblivion, we must consider the roots and the dynamics of 
experimentation.4 The way opened by studies of the philosophy of 
experiment opens a promising course for navigating the waters between the 
Scilla of theoreticism and the Caribdis of sociological reductionism.  
 
2. Experiment and its Interpretation: The Basic Structure 
In traditional speech about data and experimental results, these are 
presented as ready-made elements emerging from some black box. The 
possible structural and dynamical complexities in the modus operandi of 
that black box, what I shall call the “processes of data formation,” are not a 
focus of attention. Indeed, the traditional idea of empiricists is that we are 
actually talking of a “white box:” a transparent process of reception of 
impressions, which ends up in an automatic and infallible disposition to 
formulate basic statements. On a completely different line, we find Popper’s 
peculiar idea that basic statements are like pillars introduced from above 
(theories rule) into the “swamp” of observational and experimental work, 
pillars ultimately justified “by convention.”5 Although Popper never 
extracted the radical conclusions that this position is calling for, others (e. 
g., Lakatos) did. 
                                     
4 Note that this formulation, properly understood, involves the theoretical phase, since 
both ‘phases’ are in almost constant interaction. But it emphasizes that which is still the 
least known and understood.  
5 Cf. POPPER, K. R., Logik der Forschung, Tübingen, Mohr, 1935, chapter 5. (Translated into 
English by the author with the assistance of Julius Freed y Lan Freed: The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959.) 
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It will be worthwhile to pause for a note on terminology. Here, as in 
previous work, I follow the scientist’s usual way of talking when it comes to 
experimental and observational data. An alternative terminology has been 
proposed by Bogen and Woodward, who contrast “data” and “phenomena” 
with connotations that are fundamentally different from mine, as their 
“data” mean the fluctuating outcomes of particular experimental trials, 
while “phenomena” are the stable constructs which are theories are meant 
to predict and explain.6 So the reader should beware: data in my sense are 
the “phenomena” of Bogen, Woodward and others, which is why I 
emphasize the need to speak about processes of data formation. 
In detailed considerations, it is customary to think that the production 
of an experimental result involves at least three elements —a material 
procedure, an instrumental model, and a phenomenic model:7 
a) The material procedure is a complex of objects and actions, or 
interventions, performed practically in the material world: arranging the 
apparatus and the specimens, and making them function properly (i.e., 
setting them to work in the proper sequence and controlling their 
performance).  
b) The instrumental model expresses a certain conceptual 
understanding on the side of the experimenter about how the apparatus 
works; this is central to the design, realization, and interpretation of the 
experiment. Such models can be of a highly theoretical and mathematical 
nature, but sometimes they depend on a modest amount of low-level 
theory.  
                                     
6 Cf. BOGEN, J. and WOODWARD, J., “Saving the Phenomena,” The Philosophical Review, v. 97, 
(1988), pp. 303–352. A good number of other philosophers (for instance, Mauricio Suárez) 
have adopted this peculiar terminology. 
7 See, e.g., PICKERING, A., “Living in the Material World,” in GOODING, D., PINCH, T. J. and 
SCHAFFER, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 
pp. 276–277. 
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c) The phenomenic model codifies basic elements of the way in which 
the experimenter understands conceptually aspects of the phenomenal 
world that are under study; without it, the results would lack sense and 
meaning and could not be interpreted. And again, phenomenic models do 
not always depend on high theory.8 
To present these ingredients concretely, giving a clear and simple 
example that we shall continue using in the sequel —Newton’s famous 
experiments on the decomposition of sunlight—, the three elements are as 
follows:  
a’) The material procedure includes the prisms (made of some or 
another kind of glass, sometimes filled with water), screens, procedures to 
modify the incident light (from simple holes on a window shutter, to lenses 
employed to colimate the light), etc.  
b’) The instrumental model is built upon an interpretation of the 
material procedure in terms of an antecedently established theory, 
geometrical optics, so that in this case it depends on high theory. (The 
model did not consider details about possible differences between different 
kinds of glass, and this was historically important.) 
c’) The phenomenic model is again formulated by means of 
geometrical optics, concretely by using the concepts of a ray of light and 
ideas about its behaviour upon reflection or refraction. The model assumed 
idealisations that are typical of geometrical optics, like ignoring the fact 
that shadows have fuzzy edges. 
On this last point I should add a clarification. You know of course that 
Newton was a corpuscularist, believing light to consist in tiny corpuscles 
travelling at great speed, and that he opposed the wave theories that had 
been formulated at the time. However, in his optical writings he made an 
effort to establish key theses —in particular the principle that simple light 
                                     
8 Remember, e. g., the “taxonomies” of Kuhn’s late work. 
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rays are associated with colours and have a characteristic refrangibility— 
on a basis that was neutral with respect to the physical theories in dispute. 
This is why his phenomenic model does not presuppose corpuscularism 
and is based on geometrical optics, by then a classic theory, well 
established at least among “mathematicians.”  
Traditional images of experimentation would suggest that, at the stage 
of justification, the material procedure and the instrumental model remain 
fixed and unaltered. Their features would be relatively natural and 
uncontroversial, both for the particular scientist who first proposed them, 
and for the scientific community that must replicate the experiments and 
judge the results. Meanwhile, the phenomenic model would be more 
flexible or “plastic,” since of course one allows for the possibility of 
competing theories defended by different scientists. Moreover, in what was 
traditionally (since the 19th century) presented as the prototype 
experiment, the main goal would be to measure in great accuracy some 
data to be contrasted with theoretical predictions, or perhaps some 
parameter fixed by theory (e. g., a physical constant, as a result of which 
the phenomenic model would be refined and specified to a greater level of 
precision). 
But sociologists of science have challenged those assumptions, 
studying in detail cases where one finds the scientist showing almost no 
flexibility as regards the phenomenic model, but treating the other two 
components as very flexible indeed. Famous in this regard is Pickering’s 
work on what he called “the hunting of the quark,” some experiments 
performed by the Italian physicist Morpurgo during a period of 15 years. 
The studies of Harry Collins on the search for gravitational waves are also 
well known and have been celebrated.9 Pickering concludes that the three 
                                     
9 For discussion and questions about the details of the case studies offered by Collins and 
Pickering, see FRANKLIN, A., “Experiment in Physics,” in ZALTA, E. N., (ed.), The Stanford 
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structural elements a), b) and c) are equally plastic resources that, far from 
being fixed and determined, can be modified at will until a result of 
coherence is attained. He believes that experimental work begins in such a 
way that there no definite relation between the structural ingredients: 
“incoherence and uncertainty are the distinctive seals of experiment,” as 
shown abundantly by studies of laboratory life. But at the end of the day, 
some form of non-trivial coherence is obtained, a stabilization such that 
“material procedures, (…) when interpreted through an instrumental 
model, produce facts within the framework of a phenomenic model.”10  
The analysis of such processes of interactive stabilization between the 
three structural elements constitutes what, in the sociologist’s perspective, 
would correspond to our dynamics of experimentation. Any conclusion we 
may finally extract about experimental activity, be it about its epistemic 
relevance, or say its dependence upon contextual factors, will obviously 
hang on the characteristics attributed to the structural ingredients, and to 
their interrelations. 
If Pickering’s position is somehow typical, the main point in dispute 
today would no longer be the “social construction” of experimental results, 
a conception of sociological reductionism that has been superseded by 
many promoters of social studies of science. But there remain the hot 
problems of the epistemic reliability of experimental data, the extent to 
which they provide information on natural processes, as opposed to the 
possibility of vicious circles,11 or a mere coherentist stabilization such as 
                                                                                                                      
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/physics-experiment/ (access on 
November 2007) See also the abridged Spanish version: FRANKLIN, A., “Física y 
experimentación,” Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 221–242. An interesting exchange 
between Franklin and Collins took place in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, v. 
25, n. 3, (1994), pp. **. 
10 PICKERING, A., “Living in the Material World,” in GOODING, D., PINCH, T. J. and SCHAFFER, S. 
(eds), The Uses of Experiment, pp. 277–278. 
11 Cf. COLLINS, H. M., Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, 
passim. 
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described by Pickering.12 All of this depends on whether the structural 
elements are “equally plastic” or not.  
The coherentist thesis has been formulated again by Hacking, who 
speaks of a “self-vindication” of laboratory sciences, and presents the idea 
as a kind of expanded Duhem thesis.13 If correct, the thesis of Pickering and 
Hacking would have noteworthy consequences. It would be definitive 
confirmation of the “theory-ladenness” of results, certainly in the company 
of their correlative “technics-ladenness” and “social-ladenness,” but forcing 
us to abandon as elusive or noumenical —to abuse of Kant’s terminology— 
any possible “nature-ladenness.” Maybe the business of science would have 
its continuity and production of technological effects guaranteed (albeit 
one could not quite understand why), but from an epistemic point of view 
it would lack any special justification. 
Points like those are thus crucial to any conclusion with respect to the 
epistemic reliability of the whole scientific enterprise, hence to the project 
of a philosophy of science. After all Einstein, even during his period of 
greatest enthusiasm for the theoretical and mathematical components of 
science (and although he was willing to grant that “the creative principle 
resides in mathematics”), emphasized that “experience remains, of course, 
the sole criterion of the physical utility of a mathematical construction.” 
And some years later, Feynman would begin his lectures saying: “The 
principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test of all 
knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific 
‘truth’.”14 So, is that “metaphysical” idea, the concept of Nature, totally 
foreign to this game? 
                                     
12 Cf. PICKERING, A., The Mangle of Practice, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995. 
13 Cf. HACKING, I., “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences,” in PICKERING, A. (ed.), 
Science as Practice and Culture, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp. 29-64. 
14 Quoted from the famous FRANKLIN, A., Feynman Lectures on Physics, Addison-Wesley, 
Reading, 1963, in FRANKLIN, A., “Experiment in Physics,” in E. N. ZALTA (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, note 1. 
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3. The “Experimenter’s Regress” 
Let us come back to Newton’s famous experiments. Contrary to 
common lore, historians have established that his work on the composition 
of light, and in particular his experimentum crucis, were by no means an 
immediate success. Indeed, Schaffer has turned this case into another 
argument for the decisive influence of sociological factors in science’s 
decision making. The experimentum crucis was contested during some fifty 
years, mainly —but not only— due to the difficulty of replicating its 
quantitative results.15 A quick reading of the controversies suggests that 
Newton was arguing as follows: “simple” rays of light behaved according to 
his statements, but this could only be detected using “good” prisms, and 
“good” prisms were those which produced “simple” rays. 
Thus the case is presented as a clear illustration of what Collins has 
termed the “experimenter’s regress,” that menaces the epistemic reliability 
of experimental results. The experimenter’s regress of Collins consists in a 
vicious circle that stems from severe problems with the replication of 
experiments and the calibration of scientific instruments. The main 
problem is that correct results are only obtained using apparatus that 
functions properly, while the apparatus is functioning properly only if it 
provides correct results.16 So in the last analysis the outcomes of a scientific 
controversy do not depend so much on what “Nature” has to “say,” or on 
any special use of methods with some epistemic virtues, but on who is the 
experimenter in a social position of dominance, that enables her or him to 
determine what is correct and what functions properly. Collins offers as 
prototypical the case of J. Weber’s experiments on gravitational waves,17 
                                     
15 See SCHAFFER, S., “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” in GOODING, 
D., PINCH, T. J. and SCHAFFER, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, pp. **.  
16 Cf. COLLINS, H. M., Changing Order, chapters. 4 and 5. 
17 See COLLINS, H. M., Changing Order, ** and FRANKLIN, A., “Experiment in Physics,” passim. 
Collins makes a lot of the statement that “there are no formal criteria” that could be 
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but the example of Newton’s experiments, in Schaffer’s interpretation, is by 
no means worse. In this case, Schaffer argues that it was well into the 18th 
century (around 1715), when Newton enjoyed a position of extraordinary 
influence as President of the Royal Society, that he displayed diplomatic 
activities ending up in the promotion of his scientific views in France.  
I believe that this interpretation is incorrect, which incidentally shows 
that good history of science (such as Schaffer’s) is still not sufficient for an 
in-depth philosophical analysis. I shall now offer my own revision of the 
case, where the third kind of practices mentioned above (practices of 
communication) plays an important role.  
In good measure, the polemics generated by Newton’s work and his 
experimentum crucis were caused by himself, by what we might call a 
youthful error in his strategy of argument. Retrospectively one can locate 
the main error, not in anything Newton did while investigating the matter, 
but in the way he wrote his first published paper on natural philosophy.18 
The ‘error’ was motivated by Newton’s great experience with mathematical 
texts, and his lack of experience in physical controversies. The young 
Newton believed that he could solve the question in great brevity and full 
precision by writing more geometrico: two carefully planned experimental 
“demonstrations,” together with a series of definitions and propositions, 
would suffice to convince his readers. (The reader should notice that 
modern protocols for doing and reporting experimental research only 
consolidated during the 19th century, while the millenary Euclidean style 
                                                                                                                      
applied to decide whether the instruments are functioning properly. On this topic, see 
footnote 4 above. 
18 Cf. NEWTON, I. “A Letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, Professor of the Mathematicks in the 
University of Cambridge; Containing his New Theory about Light and Colors,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, v. 80, (1672), pp. 3075-3087. Available on 
the web, see http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/prism.php?id=47 (access on 
November 2007). Reprinted (among others) as “Letter to Mr. Oldenbourg on Light and 
Colours,” in HORSLEY, S. (ed.), Opera Quae Extant Omnia, **, London, 1779–1785, vol. IV; 
reprinted by F. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1964. 
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of writing mathematics remained paradigmatic for scientists throughout 
the 17th and 18th centuries.) 
Newton based all of his argument on two experiments, of which the 
first was extremely rudimentary, even though he offered some variations of 
the theme (one prism projecting an elongated image onto a screen), and 
the second was quite sophisticated, being offered in a single purportedly 
definitive version. This “experimentum crucis” employed two prisms and 
two screens by means of which a monochrome ray of light was isolated, 
with results that were meant to stamp the key proposition that sunlight 
consists in a mixture of coloured rays with different specific 
refrangibilities. The famous “crucial experiment” was thus made to support 
all of the weight of proof, single-handedly. 
Both experiments turned out to be difficult to replicate, again in large 
measure because of their “mathematical” character, i.e., and perhaps 
surprisingly to the reader, precisely because the results were quantitative. 
The elongated image that Newton obtained in Cambridge was a palette of 
colours (an artificial rainbow) enlarged by a factor of 5, but the Jesuit 
Antoine Lucas working in Liège only obtained an elongation by a factor of 
3. Was this perhaps because sunlight is different in both locations? When 
Lucas published his discrepancy in the Philosophical Transactions, Newton 
took it very seriously as an offence to his honesty as a gentleman and his 
reliability as a reporter of observed physical phenomena. The discrepancy 
was relevant in the context of discarding alternative explanations of the 
result, by an argument relying on Snell’s law of refraction. Therefore 
Newton felt an imperious need to attack his opponent and annihilate him. 
Quite unfortunately, it never occurred to him that they could be 
confronting a real problem caused by differences in the nature of the 
prism’s glass. As the crystalline composition of glasses produced in 
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different places and factories differed greatly, it was plainly naïve to expect 
standardized quantitative results as an outcome! 
Another source of difficulties was made manifest by a highly reputed 
French experimenter, Edme Mariotte, founding member of the Académie 
des Sciences. Around 1680, Mariotte set out to reproduce the supposedly 
“crucial” experimentum crucis, finding results that he interpreted to 
contradict and even refute Newton. Having isolated a “simple” violet beam 
of light, he obtained after the second refraction tones of red and yellow 
colouring both ends of the violet image.19 What the English was inclined to 
consider an understandable imperfection of the experimental setting, was 
interpreted by his much more empiricistic colleague as a very clear 
contrary result, a vindication of the old theory of the modification of light 
by the prism (that Newton was intent on refuting). It was “evident” that in 
this experiment a ray of light of the kind that Newton called “simple” had 
been modified or shown to be complex. Given Mariotte’s deserved 
reputation as an experimenter, this episode brought as a result a very long 
delay —almost 40 years— for the acceptance of Newton’s theory in France 
and other places. 
This time the discrepancy between both actors can be located in their 
instrumental and phenomenic models, or more precisely in what we may 
term —following Hempel— the “bridge principles” necessary for Newton’s 
interpretation of the results. Their discrepancy measures the conceptual 
distance between the simple ray promoted in geometrical optics, hence in 
Newton’s models, and the concrete beam of light that the experimenter was 
able to isolate. In a sense, the epistemic character of modern science was at 
stake: whether it was to be crudely empirical, based directly upon the 
observed in the style of Mariotte, or inextricably linked with mathematical 
  14 
idealisations, as Newton advocated. In the latter’s opinion, the study of 
Nature had to be mathematical, and the narrowest beam obtained by an 
experimenter was, self-evidently, very far from the “simple” ray in the 
model. The corresponding adjustments were more than enough to explain 
away Mariotte’s observations. 
Such incidents show the enormous difficulties encountered by 
scientific research in its infancy, and make us wonder how it was possible 
to obtain any clear advances given all the material and technical 
difficulties: inexistence of standardized instruments, lack of experimental 
protocols, unreliability of the practical and intellectual training on the side 
of the savants. Little wonder that, if you wish to look for rhetorical 
elements in writings and letters from the time, you will find plenty of 
material that can be used for the conclusion that Collins’ regress was fully 
in action, that the dispute was impossible to close except by an appeal to 
politico-diplomatic operations. A clear example of social construction and 
negotiation, it seems.  
 
4. Complications in the Dynamics of Experiment 
Is that really so? Were there elements that made it possible to break 
the vicious circle of Collins and Schaffer? I believe the answer is yes. In the 
present case, those elements were elaborated by Newton himself in the 
initial researches during the period 1666–1670, and were presented to the 
public mainly in the Opticks of 1704. Let me argue the case. 
The two polemics mentioned above indicate two important aspects of 
the complex dynamics of experimentation. First, experiments are 
dependent on technics,20 so that it has often happened like in Newton’s 
                                                                                                                      
19 See GUERLAC, H., Newton on the Continent, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1981, pp. 98–
99. Mariotte’s work appeared as a book: MARIOTTE, E., De la nature des couleurs, **Paris, 
1681; which can also be found in his Oeuvres, vol. 1, ** Leiden, 1717. 
20 I employ this uncommon term in order to try to capture the Spanish distinction between 
technology (a sophisticated form of technical development, dependent upon science) and 
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case: it is impossible to strengthen the experimental results without a 
simultaneous advancement of technics, and this complicates experimental 
work enormously. Knowing the composition of light made it necessary to 
learn about glass, its composition, and the techniques for its production. 
Without this process of refinement of glass production techniques, the later 
development of spectrography would have been impossible.21 And of 
course, the process could not be completed quickly, but required many 
years. We have seen how this created considerable difficulties for the early 
attempts at quantification. And yet, all that is not sufficient to produce a 
vicious circle. 
Second, we have encountered complications linked with the models 
employed (models of the experimental design and of the phenomena), and 
very especially difficulties linked with the “bridge principles,” relating to 
the kind of theoretical development that was sought. Such problems could 
not be avoided, even with Newton’s special effort to employ instrumental 
and phenomenic models that remained neutral between the theories in 
confrontation. Newton’s idea was to force his results upon all parts, and so 
it happened with those who were favourable to mathematisation, to an 
alignment between physical optics and the other mathematical sciences. 
But these were not “all” parties.  
Looking at the long duration, modern science has sided with Newton, 
with the option to go “beyond the appearances;” it has made a bet for 
mathematised theories. By contrast, Mariotte’s case is reminiscent of the 
later criticisms of Goethe against the theory of colours: An option for the 
empirical and the visible, sometimes based on (geometrically) very poor 
arguments, but sometimes offering an intelligent critique of insistence on 
                                                                                                                      
the more primitive and basic “technics” (in my language, respectively, Tecnología and 
Técnica). 
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the idea that Natura has an interior and an exterior, an apparent shell 
hiding a real content. Such insistence, however, triumphed due to the 
predictive efficiency of the models that were based on it, their high level of 
empirical adequacy, the considerable explanatory abilities shown, and not 
least their very important technological applications.22 
But there are more aspects to be considered. Third, and already 
suggested, is the idea that the qualitative aspects of a series of experiments 
can be crucial. Experimental complexities have the effect that sometimes 
the attempt to quantify may be premature, as happened with Newton’s 
experiments around 1670. This idea runs against the image of 
experimentation created in the 19th century, which depicts it mainly as 
quantification. The truth is that experiments always have an important 
qualitative component, which can be decisive not only in favouring some 
theory against some other, but also in supporting a certain interpretation 
of the experimental results themselves.23 Qualitative aspects of 
experimentation are a crucial theme for some recent authors like F. 
Steinle.24 
And fourth, a central aspect of experimental research, which was 
severely misrepresented by the inherited conceptions (here theoreticism 
was quite efficient in biasing and distorting): It is absolutely essential to 
take into account that data are not obtained automatically, instantly, or 
transparently. I believe one must speak about processes of data formation; 
                                                                                                                      
21 On this topic, see e.g., MCGUCKEN, W., Nineteenth Century Spectroscopy, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1969, and SÁNCHEZ RON, J. M. Historia de la Física Cuántica, 
Crítica, Barcelona, 2001. 
22 Nevertheless, sometimes one may be inclined to think that the search for the simple 
ultimate element (that holy grail of physicists) could be illusory, the product of an 
erroneous approach. 
23 This question was raised already in KUHN, TH. S., “The Function of Measurement in 
Modern Physics,” Isis, v. 52, n. 2, (1961), pp. 161-193. Reprinted in KUHN, TH. S., The 
Essential Tension, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, ch. VIII, pp. 178-224. A 
very interesting paper that unfortunately founds no continuation in his work. 
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one has to emphasize that experimental research must be analysed in 
terms of series of experiments. Examples can be multiplied at will, and 
although I shall continue focusing my discussion on the case of Newton, let 
me mention that of Pieter Zeeman and the celebrated effect he discovered 
in 1896 (the influence of magnetic fields on spectral lines, splitting them). 
A first successful experiment was far from convincing him, and he 
proceeded to make some others with the aim to control some variables 
(density, temperature, distribution of the substance emitting the radiation) 
that could conceivably affect the outcome. (Conceivably, that is, according 
to what theory suggested, or sometimes according to what analogies with 
other experiments suggested.) Zeeman wrote the following sentence, which 
clearly suggests the topic of series of experiments as the source of data: 
“The different experiments ... make it more and more probable that 
the absorption —and hence also the emission— lines of an incandescent 
vapour are widened by the action of magnetism.”25 
Incidentally, Zeeman’s early experiments were rather exploratory, 
guided by vague considerations about the possibility of an interrelation, 
but later his research was guided by Lorentz’s theory that spectral lines are 
caused by the vibration of atoms, and at the same time his experiments 
brought important modifications and refinements into this theory.26 
To come back to Newton, the point I want to make is that his practice 
of argumentation differed from the practice of his experimental researches. 
                                                                                                                      
24 See, e. g., STEINLE, F., “Challenging Established Concepts: Ampère and Exploratory 
Experimentation,” Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 291-316. 
25 Pieter Zeeman in October 1896, quoted by ARABATZIS, T., Representing Electrons: A 
Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2006, p. 176. On this topic see also BUCHWALD, J. Z. and WARWICK, A. (eds.), Histories of the 
Electron: The Birth of Microphysics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001. 
26 The intriguing predictions of Lorentz’s theory of “ions” turned out to be correct, but the 
measurements of the ratio e/m showed that the intervening particles were much smaller 
than those in electrolysis, they had to be sub-atomical —and thus the “ions” became 
“electrons.” See ARABATZIS, T., Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to 
Theoretical Entities, ch. 4. 
  18 
As we saw above, his publication of 1672 was a clear bet for “decisive” 
experiments, carefully selected to support central elements of the theory; 
in this case, the experimentum crucis. In the midst of polemics, in 1776, he 
wrote: “For it is not the number of Exp[erimen]ts, but their weight that has 
to be considered; and when one may serve, what need is there of many?”27  
With such rhetoric he was trying to stop his opponents from trying 
new designs of their own invention, and restrict their attention exclusively 
to the experimentum crucis with two prisms. But his own practice in the 
1660s had tended to multiply trials, exploring different designs and 
possible influences, trying to control alternatives and variables.28 It had 
been a long series of experiments, widely varied, which in my view 
reinforces the idea that it is never the single isolated experiment, but a 
whole experimental series, in its complexity, what counts when it comes to 
establishing experimental results.  
Newton himself seems to have learnt the lesson well through the 
polemics of the 1670s, which he experienced as such an unpleasant thing. 
This may well be why the Opticks of 1704 is actually more similar to the 
university lectures of 1670–72 than to the famous paper, as far as the 
number and variety of experiments goes. While in the paper (Newton’s 
letter to Oldenbourg, 1672) there was an attempt to base the key 
proposition —that sunlight consists in a mixture of rays of different 
refrangibilities— upon just one experiment, in the Opticks this is presented 
as a conclusion after 10 different experiments.29 It was not only Newton in 
                                     
27 Cited in GUERLAC, H., Newton on the Continent, p. 94. 
28 The available information is broad and of high quality, because both Newton’s 
notebooks and his university lectures of 1670–1672 are available. A brief and precise 
summary can be found in the excellent work of WESTFALL, R., Never at Rest: A biography of 
Isaac Newton, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 156–175, 211–222, and 
237–252. 
29 Compare the exposition in NEWTON, I., “A Letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, … Containing his 
New Theory about Light and Colors,” with that found in his Opticks, S. Smith and B. 
Walford, London, 1704, pp. ** (32-62 of the Spanish edn.). 
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the 1660s, but the whole scientific community of his time, that needed a 
wide variety of experiments before the “data” concerning refrangibilities of 
the different rays could be accepted. This is no exception, but rather the 
rule, and that is why I have been talking about series of experiments and 
processes of data formation. 
Newton’s liking for simple and “crucial” experiments (which was truly 
mathematical and very little Baconian) had its repercussion in later times, a 
long history. There emerged a tradition that counted some inheritors well 
into the 19th century, for instance, A. M. Ampère and W. Weber. But the 
tradition subsequently vanished. Here it is relevant that the 19th century 
was the time when experimental protocols were standardized and refined.  
 
5. From the “Circle” to the Helix of Experimental Research  
To the question whether there existed elements that could break the 
vicious circle of Collins and Schaffer, I have answered yes. Let me make it 
even more explicit. 
The circle is broken, and turned into a helix, mainly in two ways. First, 
strengthening the reliability of the experimental results according to 
criteria that are properly experimental, i.e., characteristic of experimental 
activity (and not of the theoretical ‘phase’). And second, by Newton’s 
insistence on the idea that one had to be careful with the notion of a 
“simple” ray. Let us consider both aspects in some detail. 
Here is a concrete example of the characteristic criteria of 
experimental practice at work. In order to show that the prisms did not 
modify visible light, but merely decomposed or analysed it, Newton 
performed a diversity of experiments: One employing two prisms 
juxtaposed in opposite senses; another with three prisms that projected 
their spectra against the same screen, in such a combination as to recover 
white light; a third with a prism followed by a lens that made the rays 
converge.  
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In the series formed by all these experiments performed by Newton 
around 1670 or earlier, we find at work two of the key elements that 
Hacking and Franklin have isolated as properly experimental criteria. (For 
this question of properly experimental criteria, one should see the 
pioneering work of Hacking and also Franklin’s discussion of experimental 
strategies.)30 Above all, there is a convergence of results obtained in three 
different ways, by distinct material procedures. And there is also a good 
measure of control over the interventions, which is obtained through 
planning based on the phenomenic and instrumental models that are 
employed. Such interventions can be guided by theories as in this case 
(guided ultimately by the clever use and application of principles of 
geometrical optics) but in other cases they can be much more exploratory 
in character, or they can even be suggested by mere analogy. 
Notice also that the results of those three experiments, being 
qualitative and not quantitative, can be reproduced without the problems 
created by the different dispersive powers of the prisms (due to the kind of 
glass employed), and so many of the difficulties derived from lack of 
technical knowledge disappear. Newton employed also prisms filled with 
water in an attempt to reduce the doubts caused by difficulties in the 
precise replication of his quantitative results. 
The second element that Newton employed in order to break the circle 
was his insistence on the idea that one had to be careful with the notion of 
a “simple” ray. He repeated it time and again, but the point was not (as 
Schaffer wants to picture it)31 that only Cambridge prisms produced simple 
                                     
30 Cf. HACKING, I., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1983, and FRANKLIN, A., “Experiment in Physics,” passim. In my view, Franklin does not 
insist sufficiently on distinguishing what belongs to verbal argument from what 
constitutes cognitive factors that are characteristic of experimental research. See the 
comments in FERREIRÓS, J. and ORDÓÑEZ, J., “Hacia una Filosofía de la experimentación,” pp. 
47–86. 
31 Cf. SCHAFFER, S., “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of Experiment,” pp. **. 
  21 
rays —it was that neither those nor the ones in Paris or Liège produced 
them. The point is merely to insist upon the difference between the simple 
ray of the mathematical model, a geometric line, and the experiment’s 
beam, something that can only be more or less coarse. If Mariotte did not 
understand or want to concede the point, it was because he rejected the 
use of mathematical models of the phenomena, in favour of crude 
empiricism. And there is, of course, evidence that other scientists accepted 
Newton’s proposal of geometrical models, if only tentatively in view of their 
predictive success, and that the scientific community at large ended up 
favouring such models wholeheartedly.32 
In that way, the circle did not come back onto itself, but rather —to 
exploit the geometric metaphor— it “regressed” on a slightly higher plane, 
forming a helix. A helicoid can seem a circle to us, when we look upon it 
from a certain biased angle, as our sociologists often do. But while circles 
are fundamentally retrograde, bringing us back to the same point time and 
again, helices progress by ascending from plane to plane. (Concerning the 
progressive connotations of this “helical” metaphor of scientific research, 
let me just say that my discussion concerns only local behaviour, and does 
not predetermine what may happen more globally in the development of a 
scientific discipline.) 
 
6. Concluding Remarks  
Despite all that has been said in the past, experimentation enjoys 
relative autonomy with respect to theory formation. I have been 
emphasizing that both are interacting ‘phases’ within the cognitive activity 
of scientists, and no one reigns above the other. Experiment brings into 
play epistemic or cognitive factors that are distinctive and characteristic. 
These are features that cannot be reduced to formal criteria, except of 
                                     
32 None of my remarks is meant to deny that the process was long, winded, and far from 
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course in the way in which the flight of a bird can be captured by a 
mathematical model. (Notice that “reduced” is not the adequate word, just 
like a “logicistic” insistence on basing everything upon explicit formal 
criteria can only impoverish the account and make it unable to deal with 
the richness of scientific activity.) One has to underscore that the 
“measures” of experimental validity or reliability are (in part) intrinsic to 
this kind of practice, and in this sense autonomous. The dynamics of the 
experimental phase is (partially) determined by its own peculiar 
restrictions.  
I hasten to add that the dynamics of the theoretical phase is, in my 
opinion, also (in part) determined by its own peculiar restrictions. Here 
and at this crude level of analysis, there is no asymmetry between them. 
But if that analysis is correct, one has to conclude that experimental and 
theoretical practices complement and enrich each other. As emphasized at 
the start of this paper, there is not scientific practice in the singular, but a 
plurality of coexisting practices, and the crux of the analysis has to do with 
their heterogeneous cognitive roots and their complex interactions. 33 
The aforementioned complementarity is likely to be the main source of 
the epistemic strength showed by scientific knowledge, and a clear reason 
why science is different from philosophy or religion. One has to conclude, 
furthermore, that a conception of the philosophy of science which self-
imposes limitations on its methods, such that it can only analyse correctly 
scientific theories (such was the effect, e.g., of the linguistic turn), makes it 
ipso facto unable to account for the epistemic richness of scientific 
knowledge. Here lies the source of that solidarity between “logicism” and 
sociologism which was mentioned at the start (footnote 4).  
                                                                                                                      
straightforward. 
33 Some interesting proposals concerning the role of models as “mediators” between 
theories and data can be found in the compilation MORGAN, M. S. and MORRISON, M. (eds.), 
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From what has been said above, it is easy to extract examples of 
intrinsic characteristics of the experimental phase: such are the above-
mentioned criterion of convergence between results or representations 
with diverse procedural and instrumental origins, or the heavy dependence 
of experimentation upon instruments and technical practices (from Gilbert 
and Galilei until today, there is scarcely one experimental or observational 
datum of interest that does not depend on instrumentation). A third 
example, not mentioned before, is what might be called in somewhat naïve 
language “objective features” of some data or results, like regularities in 
observed movements (such as in Galilei’s observations of Jupiter’s moons), 
or evidence for entities with constant properties (as in the work of 
Thomson and Zeeman on the electron).  
At the beginning I stated that calling for a philosophy of science that is 
able to analyse the experimental phase complicates matters for the 
philosopher, since it forces her to broaden the panoply of tools. Fine 
analysis of the factors that enter into experimental activity should include 
questions belonging to the cognitive sciences, with a strong basis on 
biology and physics, and it should also include the analysis of instrumental 
or technical practices. Experimentation is not a simple matter of 
observation, for it sets into play many diverse processes of manipulation 
and perception. (Notice that perception, a high-level cognitive process, 
must be neatly distinguished from the mere sensorial stimulation that was 
so dear to Quine.) It involves mechanisms of motor control, attention, 
perception, memory, language, etcetera, in short: the whole gamut of 
cognitive processes studied by psychology and neuroscience, and more. 
This viewpoint does not seem to be accepted by many partisans of 
social studies, such as Pickering, who regards the three main structural 
                                                                                                                      
Models as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1999.  
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ingredients of experiment —material procedure, instrumental model, 
phenomenic model; see sect. 2 above— as comparable elements, which can 
be treated as if they had very similar levels of material and cognitive 
complexity.34 Pickering defends that, starting from a situation of disparity 
and disunion, the scientist modifies those ingredients in search of 
compatibility and stability, and that such a process can be adequately 
understood from the assumption that all of them are eminently plastic 
resources. Among the factors that condition the process of interactive 
stabilisation of these resources, there are according to Pickering “material 
resistances,” but also all kinds of limitations to which theoretical work can 
be subject, many of them arbitrary, and also, quite naturally, all kinds of 
sociological factors. 
Once again we find the old temptation to which philosophy has 
yielded so often, the wish to solve everything too quickly, simplifying too 
much, relying on an impoverishing analysis, as if that should not put the 
main goal in jeopardy. Pickering’s resulting scheme is too “philosophical,” 
to use this adjective in its negative connotations. He esteems too highly our 
creative, modifying abilities, the margin of freedom that is open to our 
elaboration of artificial universes. In my opinion, the point is simply that 
the three ingredients mentioned above are not homogeneous —not by far. 
The material procedures and their operations are of far greater complexity 
than the models, and their complexity keeps defying our analytical 
abilities. 
It is quite easy to say “material procedure,” but think of some 
particular case, such as the prism experiments that we have mentioned 
repeatedly, or even more the experiments with tubes of cathode rays, 
electromagnetic plates, and substances like sodium or lithium, performed 
                                     
34 Cf. PICKERING, A. “Living in the Material World,” pp. ** and PICKERING, A., The Mangle of 
Practice, pp. **. 
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by Zeeman and Thomson. To analyse all the cognitive and biological, 
technical and physical processes that took place in any of these cases (both 
what concerns the apparatus and samples, and what relates to the 
experimenters) is a task of enormous, indeed forbidding complexity. To 
hide this high complexity, which calls for analyses of both technics and 
cognitive processes, is a way of falling into simplifications as abusive as 
those of old theoreticism.  
The above comments may suffice to underscore once again what is 
specific and characteristic of a philosophy of experimentation. But I would 
not like to finish without making a new effort to eliminate one possible 
misunderstanding, and so I add a word about the intervention of theories 
in experiment. The thesis of a relative autonomy of experimentation is not 
a thesis against all forms of determination of experiment by theory: 
Certainly the celebrated thesis of “theory-ladenness,” as usually presented, 
is very biased and incomplete, but the point is no to deny it outright. 
Theories and research frames do play an important role as guides of 
experimental research. As so many authors have emphasized, the 
elaboration of experimental results is too complex to be possible without 
the aid of maps and drafts that help to organize and simplify the work, as 
unilaterally as it may be. Which, however, does not turn theory into the 
queen of scientific activity. It is, therefore, fitting to conclude bringing to 
mind the general principle (which I have proposed as an elaboration on the 
old description of science as “experimental philosophy”) that science is 
both philosophy and technics, a hybrid of theorisation and 
experimentation, which could not survive without the richness conferred 
upon it by the mestizo interaction of both dimensions. 
 
7. References  
ARABATZIS, T., Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to 
Theoretical Entities, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006. 
  26 
BOGEN, J. and WOODWARD, J., “Saving the Phenomena,” The 
Philosophical Review, v. 97, (1988), pp. 303–352. 
BUCHWALD, J. Z. and WARWICK, A. (eds.), Histories of the Electron: The 
Birth of Microphysics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001. 
COLLINS, H. M., Changing Order. Replication and Induction in Scientific 
Practice, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992 (original edition 
1985). 
FERREIRÓS, J. and ORDÓÑEZ, J., “Hacia una Filosofía de la 
experimentación,” Crítica, v. 34, n. 102, (2002), pp. 47–86. 
FERREIRÓS, J. and ORDÓÑEZ, J. (eds.), Theoria Experimentorum, 
monographic issue of Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002).  
FRANKLIN, A., Feynman Lectures on Physics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
1963. 
FRANKLIN, A., “Experiment in Physics,” in ZALTA, E. N., (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/physics-experiment/ 
(access on November 2007). There is an abridged Spanish version: 
FRANKLIN, A., “Física y experimentación,” Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 
221–242. 
GOODING, D., PINCH, T. J. and SCHAFFER, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
GUERLAC, H., Newton on the Continent, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1981. 
HACKING, I., Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1983. 
HACKING, I., “The Self-Vindication of the Laboratory Sciences,” in 
PICKERING, A. (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992, pp. 29-64. 
  27 
HEIDELBERGER, M. and STEINLE, F. (eds.), Experimental Essays – Versuche 
zum Experiment, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1998. 
KUHN, TH. S., “The Function of Measurement in Modern Physics,” Isis, v. 
52, n. 2, (1961), pp. 161-193. Reprinted in KUHN, TH. S., The Essential 
Tension, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, ch. VIII, pp. 178-
224. 
MARIOTTE, E., De la nature des couleurs, **Paris, 1681. 
MARIOTTE, E., Oeuvres, vol. 1, **Leiden, 1717. 
MCGUCKEN, W., Nineteenth Century Spectroscopy, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1969. 
MORGAN, M. S. and MORRISON, M. (eds.), Models as Mediators. 
Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999. 
NEWTON, I., “A Letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, Professor of the 
Mathematicks in the University of Cambridge; Containing his New Theory 
about Light and Colors,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, v. 
80, (1672), pp. 3075-3087. Available on the web, see 
http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/prism.php?id=47 (access on 
November 2007). Reprinted, among others, as “Letter to Mr. Oldenbourg on 
Light and Colours,” in HORSLEY, S. (ed.), Opera Quae Extant Omnia, **, 
London, 1779–1785, vol. IV; reprinted by F. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1964. 
NEWTON, I., Opticks, S. Smith and B. Walford, London, 1704. Also 
(among others) in HORSLEY, S. (ed.), Opera Quae Extant Omnia, **, London, 
1779–1785, vol. IV; reprinted by F. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1964.  
PICKERING, A., “Living in the Material World,” in GOODING, D., PINCH, T. J. 
and SCHAFFER, S. (eds.), The Uses of Experiment, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989, pp. **. 
PICKERING, A., The Mangle of Practice, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1995. 
  28 
POPPER, K. R., Logik der Forschung, Tübingen, Mohr, 1935. Translated 
into English by the author with the assistance of Julius Freed y Lan Freed: 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959. 
SÁNCHEZ RON, J. M. Historia de la Física Cuántica, Crítica, Barcelona, 
2001. 
SCHAFFER, S., “Glass Works: Newton’s Prisms and the Uses of 
Experiment,” in GOODING, D., PINCH, T. J. and SCHAFFER, S. (eds.), The Uses of 
Experiment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. **. 
STEINLE, F., “Challenging Established Concepts: Ampère and Exploratory 
Experimentation,” Theoria, v. 17, n. 44, (2002), pp. 291- 316. 
WESTFALL, R., Never at Rest: A biography of Isaac Newton, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1980. 
 
